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<AT>What Van Gend en Loos stands for?<AT> 
 
<AA>Damian Chalmers and Luis Barroso
*
</AA> 
 
<ABS>Three transformational developments flowed from Van Gend en Loos: the central symbols 
and ideals of EU law; an autonomous legal order with more power than traditional treaties; and a 
system of individual rights and duties. The judgment also set out how each of these developments 
was to be deployed. The symbols and ideals were set out to proclaim EU authority rather than to go 
to what the EU did. What the EU did was, above all, government through law. The EU legal order 
was conceived, above all, therefore, as a vehicle for the expression of EU government. This, in turn, 
shaped the allocation of individual rights which were predominantly granted  only where they 
furthered the realization of the collective objectives of EU government. Conceiving EU law as 
governmental law also left a profound and negative effect on EU legal meaning. This became 
shaped by EU law being reduced to something to sustain activities valued by EU government rather 
than to provide a wider, more emancipatory imaginary. </ABS> 
 
<H1>1. Introduction</H1> 
 
<p>Van Gend en Loos (VGL) was understood very differently at the time to how it is understood 
today.
1
 Within the Court, it was seen as a compromise judgment
2
 and the distinguished 
comparatists, Riesenfeld and Buxbaum, noted that the judgment neither ventured “beyond the line 
of minimum exposure’ nor engaged in “a premature entanglement with constitutional niceties.”3 
Today, the situation is very different. On its 50th anniversary, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) described it as the “source of and a framework for the principles which have shaped 
the constitutional structure of the European Union.”4 The reason is that VGL stands for different 
things now and then. It now carries over fifty years of legal and academic baggage that it did not 
                                                     
*We are grateful to Susanna Mancini for her valuable and perceptive comments on a draft. All errors are the authors’.  
1
 Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue 
Administration, 1963 E.C.R. 1. 
2
 Morten Rasmussen, The Origin of a Legal Revolution—The Early History of the European Court of Justice, 14 J. EUR. 
INTEGRATION HIST. 77, 91–97 (2008). 
3
 Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Richard M. Buxbaum, N. V. Algemene Transport- En Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en 
Loos c. Administration Fiscale Neerlandaise: A Pioneering Decision of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities, 58 AM. J. INT’L L. 152, 157 (1964).  
4
 The Court marks the 50th anniversary of the judgment in Van Gend en Loos, Conference Proceedings, May 15, 2013, 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/P_95693/. 
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then. The importance of what VGL stands for was well understood by the academics, lawyers, and 
Commission officials who maneuvered to generate a narrative for it at the time.
5
 However, possibly 
because this question is so multilayered and so exacting, it has never been problematized. For what 
VGL stands for can go to many things: a way of life held out to European citizens, the power of the 
EU legal order, and the grant of justiciable rights and duties which empower some and disempower 
others. In reality, it stands for all of these, and that makes it the central question to ask of VGL.  
<p1>These different elements were wrapped up within three claims by VGL, which shaped 
how they were expressed and what VGL was, subsequently, to stand for. The first proclaimed the 
authority of EU law. As the scale of authority proclaimed was high—the limitation of national 
sovereignty—corresponding reasons had to be provided for this, namely EU law possessed more 
exalted qualities than the national sovereign. This led VGL to provide a rich symbolism and 
idealism for EU law. The second claim went to the regulatory qualities of EU law. It set out EU law 
as something through which EU government could be realized by setting out how EU law as an 
effective policy tool. As a consequence, VGL set out the template for how EU legal doctrine would 
contribute to realization of the objectives of EU government. The final claim went to the 
recognition of different interests through the grant of justiciable rights. This endowment of rights 
and responsibilities not only generated geographies of power, they also served to create a broader 
recognition of the worth of their beneficiaries. These rights, in turn, established legal communities 
through the setting out of associative ties and mutual commitments between individuals. These 
communities in turn, shaped the meaning of EU law through setting the material and ideational 
context for its interpretation.  
<p1>It is the interrelationship between these claims which leads to ambivalence about 
acclaiming what VGL stands for. As the symbols and ideals of EU law are contained in a 
proclamation, they go in no detailed way to what EU law does. They sustain but do not strongly 
constrain EU government, with the center of gravity of EU law  lieing as an instrument of that 
government. By contrast, the governmental qualities of EU law strongly determined the allocation 
of individual rights. These were granted predominantly for the realization of collective objectives 
set by EU government. As a consequence, despite its promise, only a patina of unevenly distributed 
rights has emerged from VGL. The most troubling legacy of VGL is, however, the moral compass 
left by it. The interpretive setting for EU legal rights is one in which individuals come together 
                                                     
5
 Morten Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice: The Role of the European Law Associations, in SOCIETAL 
ACTORS IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: POLITY BUILDING AND POLICY MAKING 1958–1992, at 173 (Wolfram Kaiser & 
Jan-Henrik Meyer eds., 2013); Antoine Vauchez, The making of the European Union’s Constitutional Foundations: The 
Brokering Role of Legal Associations and Networks, in TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION: 
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exclusively for shared purposes which contribute to EU government. This is a peculiarly thin vision 
of community through which to interpret legal rights. It leads to their meaning being so subsumed 
by this idea of shared purpose that familiar and important legal concepts carry disfigured 
interpretations in EU law, which simply do not resonate with understandings these found elsewhere.  
 
 
<H1>2. The proclamation of the symbols and ideals of EU authority</H1> 
 
<p>The first matter addressed in VGL is not the question regarding the direct effect of what is now 
Article 30 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) asked by the Dutch 
court, but a question of the more general quality of authority enjoyed by EU law. This is 
unsurprising. Van Gend en Loos could not enjoy tax-free imports protected by Dutch courts if the 
Treaty offering them enjoyed only pipedream authority. The judgment  epitomized, however, a 
more general challenge to EU law. To present any kind of legal vision for its subjects, even on an 
arcane issue such as this, EU law would also have to set out the quality of obedience it generated. 
The two are mutually dependent. An EU vision of life is necessary to justify its authority just as this 
authority is necessary to make that vision a regulatory reality rather than a imaginary experience. 
Furthermore, there is a sliding scale. Grander panoramas offered by EU law would impose greater 
demands of obedience, just as stronger claims to authority would require ever more enticing visions 
of life. 
<p1>This presented a dilemma. In VGL, a high level of authority for EU law was being 
sought. Only through the limitation of national sovereignty could there be a piercing of the  
territoriality which granted states a monopoly over the effects of treaties within their domestic legal 
systems. Sovereignty, as the power “to let live,” however, could only be displaced by a figure with 
commensurately valued qualities.
6
 Furthermore, subjects would be expected to follow EU law over 
the sovereign even if a majority disagreed with individual decisions or if those decisions entailed 
significant costs. Simply asserting the benefits of integration would be insufficient to secure 
obedience , particularly on a fiscally marginal tax such as customs duties. Such authority required 
faith to be placed in EU law. It had to be trusted as both representing something of value and as 
capable of securing something of value. Both of these issues go to the attributes of EU law. These 
attributes must, on the one hand, symbolize a way of life which has both resonance and is worthy of 
praise in the eyes of EU law’s subjects. On the other, EU law had to be marked by a certain capacity 
or strength if it was to be seen as something which did not simply make claims about these values 
but could realize them. A matter of fact assertion or a vainglorious boast would not be enough to 
                                                     
6
 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 142 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., 1998). 
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inculcate faith in either the value or capacity of EU law. Historically, the mechanism for allowing 
these to be recognized has been that of ceremony. Ceremony has been central to the institution of 
authority with an external audience, whose pedigree to recognize authority is not in doubt, being 
assembled to acclaim both the status of the authority figure and her symbolic power.
7
 
<p1>This ceremony was not available in VGL. The judgment, instead, in a three-stage 
proclamation of the  authority of EU law, which paralleled, even if it did not mirror, the central 
elements of authority set out by these ceremonies. 
<p1>Authority figures are deemed, first, to act on behalf of a higher presence (i.e. the 
sovereign in the case of a nation state). This presence both bequeaths authority and is a repository of 
values and symbols. The allure of this higher presence lies partly in its mystery. It is something 
never fully known or knowable. In VGL, this presence is a legally constituted, postnational 
community which has the attributes of national communities but also attributes unparalleled by 
national communities. Its mystery is protected by the cryptic description ofthis community in the 
judgment. Although oft cited, it is worth recalling the relevant passage in VGL: 
  
<EXT>The Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of 
which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the 
subjects of which comprise not only member states but also their nationals. Independently of 
the legislation of member states, Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on 
individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal 
heritage.</EXT> 
 
<p1>The mention of individual subjects with their own obligations, rights, and heritage 
envisages a community beyond the state. This idea of community replicates rather that of a “human 
order,” which Charles Taylor has observed to be the central source of political value. Assuming 
various names (the nation, the people, the public), this human order is in all cases depicted “as 
historical agents, bodies in a material world, which move towards modes of common life in which 
our individuality is respected (at first as free rights bearers, then later there are versions which want 
to make place for individual, original identities).”8 Just as this human order is to provide the secular 
grammar of value for the modern state, so, according to VGL, it is to do this for the European 
Union. The latter creates and acts for a human order marked by a common way of life in which 
individuals enjoy freedom. Other elements elevate this human order beyond that of a national order. 
The claim that EU law limits national sovereign rights, while claiming no sovereignty of its own, 
                                                     
7
 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE KINGDOM AND THE GLORY 167–177 (Lorenzo Chiesa with Matteo Mandarini trans., 2012). 
8
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suggests a limit to the power of the state over the administration of human life. The state is not 
denied the right to administer this human life but is required to justify how it conducts this 
administration..
9
 The Union human order, thus, has a civilizing mission which is to curb the 
excesses of the nation state and rectify its omissions and deficits. Finally, the grant of additional 
affiliations, rights, and responsibilities set out a new subjectivity which challenges subjects to 
rethink how they relate to one another. New entitlements open fresh horizons just as new duties 
suggests a different sensitivity to the singularities and needs of others.
10
 It is the radical promise of 
the judgment which has led scholars to project such hope onto the European Union. The European 
Union is thus associated with a European tradition of freedom;
11
 it  is a mediator between 
interdependence and difference;
12
 an ever-opening form of cosmopolitan integration;
13
 an inclusive 
communicative community of interests affected by EU law;
14
 a world project subject to the 
demands of universal intelligibility, public justification and responsibility toward all others;
15
 or a 
form of constitutional patriotism committed to sustaining citizen autonomy based on civic 
solidarity.
16
  
<p1>Second, the judgment provides a surrogate for ceremonies habitually used to acclaim 
the authority figure. To enable this, the higher presence is cast not as external to EU law, but as 
immanent to it. The passage above, therefore, sees the Union’s postnational community as 
emanating from EU law. It is to be divined, according to VGL, from the “spirit, general scheme and 
wording (of the treaty as a whole).” This human order relies on both interpretation and revelation 
for its coming into being. Internal to the EU treaties, legal interpretation provides the context for the 
revelation of this human order. Disclosure will only take place when a particular provision is being 
interpreted. However, as an immanent presence, the central dynamic is one of revelation. There is 
no text which explains the nature or details of this presence. Instead, interpretations disclose 
glimpses of it. Consequently, the vision of this community unfolds as EU law develops. Every new 
                                                     
9
 Damian Chalmers, European Restatements of Sovereignty, in SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LAW. DOMESTIC, EUROPEAN 
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 186, 188–191 (Richard Rawlings, Peter Leyland & Alison Young eds., 2013). 
10
 JULIA KRISTEVA, THE CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN SUBJECT ch. 3 (Susan Fairﬁeld trans., 2000). 
11
 Julia Kristeva, Europhilia, Europhoria, 3 CONSTELLATIONS 321, 327 (1998).  
12
 Étienne Balibar, Europe: Vanishing Mediator, 10 CONSTELLATIONS 314 (2013). 
13
 ULRICH BECK & EDGAR LAGRANDE, COSMOPOLITAN EUROPE 6–7 and 225–240 (2007). 
14
 HAUKE BRUNKHORST, SOLIDARITY: FROM CIVIC FRIENDSHIP TO A GLOBAL LEGAL COMMUNITY ch. 7 (2005, MIT) 
Chapter 7. 
15
 RODOLPHE GASCHÉ, EUROPE, OR THE INFINITE TASK: A STUDY OF A PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT 342 (2009). 
16
 I.e. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION ch. 4 (2001); Jan-Werner Müller, A European 
Constitutional Patriotism? The Case Restated, 14 EUR. L.J. 542 (2008). 
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provision or interpretation reveals a little more of it. Like a pointillist painting, dots revealing this 
image have accumulated over time to give much more elaborate and nuanced picture.  
<p1>EU law’s civilizing power, thus started as little more than protection for market actors 
from discriminatory or arbitrary national treatment.
17
 The expansion of the economic freedoms 
amplified this to protection from broader governmental malfunction by requiring states to rectify 
representation deficits or put in place systems of due process.
18
 Alongside this, the growth of equal 
opportunities, consumer, environment, and public finance law drew EU law into a broader role as 
guarantor of those interests historically vulnerable to majoritarian abuse, be they minority, diffuse, 
or future interests. This diversification continues. The policing of denial of central elements of 
citizenship to a state’s own nationals serves to protect a certain core of political community within 
the national territory.
19
 EU law on humanitarian protection and assistance increasingly carves out 
more active duties for the state to assist strangers in need.
20
 
<p1>A similar burgeoning has taken place with regard to community. Horizontal direct 
effect established this initially in legalistic formal terms through its establishment of mutual 
commitments between private actors.
21
 More substantive commitments of mutual trust and 
accommodation emerged with the doctrine of mutual recognition as states were to take into account 
the interests of citizens of other states, while other states in turn were to treat its law as the law of 
their land.
 22
 The most emblematic expansion is EU citizenship whose provision of socio-economic 
entitlements suggests the provision of ties based not on nationality but some other sense of 
attachment.
23
 The array of social and economic entitlements proliferating beyond EU citizenship 
has led to a thickening and diversification of these. De Witte has observed market solidarities based 
on legal relations of market dependence; communitarian solidarities where welfare provision is 
correlated with the reciprocal commitment shown by the EU citizen; and aspirational solidarities 
emerging from citizens making use of the opportunities availed by EU law.
24
  
                                                     
17
 Ernst-Joachim Mestmcker, On the Legitimacy of European Law, 58 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 615 (1994). 
18
 MIGUEL POIARES MADURO, WE THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
CONSTITUTION 159–174 (1998). 
19
 Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, 2011 E.C.R. I-1177. 
20
 Case C-465/07, Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 2009 E.C.R. I-921. 
21
 Famously, of course, the Court rejected the argument that as Treaty articles were only addressed to member states 
they could not create associative ties more widely: Case 43/75, DeFrenne v. Sabena (No. 2) 1976 E.C.R. 455, ¶¶ 31–32. 
22
 The interplay is best brought out in Miguel Poiares Maduro, So close and yet so far: the paradoxes of mutual 
recognition, 14 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 814 (2007). 
23
 Weiler famously talked of EU law removing nationality as “the principal referent for transnational human 
intercourse.” Joseph Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2481 (1991).  
24
 Floris de Witte, Transnational Solidarity and the Mediation of Conflicts of Justice in Europe, 18 EUR. L.J. 694, 705–
710 (2012). 
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<p1>These immanent qualities allow the ceremonial role traditionally performed by 
acclamation to be replaced by exaltation. Exaltation, the act marking out the special qualities of a 
person or object in such a way as to elevate them to great influence, in both Christian theology and 
early astrology was done by the divine creator. Only the creator had power to bestow these 
qualities, and therefore to recognize them.
25
 In VGL, the exalters of EU law are thus the member 
states, through their “acknowledge[ement of] the authority” of the treaties. The member states are 
given a collective legal presence, not found elsewhere in EU law, namely to exalt EU law. Their act 
of exaltation takes the form of a series of signs, which mark out EU law’s uniqueness (a “new legal 
order”). These signs include the scope of Treaty objectives in the establishment of a common 
market; the recognition of the peoples of Europe in the Preamble; the uniform interpretation of EU 
law recognized by the preliminary reference procedure; and the bringing together of EU nationals 
marked by the European Parliament and Economic and Social Committee.  
<p1>The exaltation’s emphasis on EU law’s having special qualities undoubtedly allowed 
the Court to dip into the rich vocabulary of fundamental rights, constitutionalism, and the rule of 
law.
26
 This has allowed it to develop important legal safeguards, greater coherence, and a more 
profound repertoire of value than that explicitly marked out in the treaties. However, exaltation is 
often marked by shrill resonance. It involves a magnification of virtue to persuade others. The 
consequence can be a hollow façade. These doctrines often have a weak epistemology and an 
uncertain regulatory reach. The EU Charter on Fundamental Rights relies not merely for its 
inspiration but, more importantly, for its interpretation, on a wide variety of other sources. As a 
result, it possesses a strong derivative quality with only limited signification of its own.
27
 It still is 
the case that only one provision of a directive, the hegemonic legislative instrument, has ever been 
found to violate EU fundamental law.
28
  
<p1>The reliance on revelation and exaltation leads to more endemic problems, however. If 
constant revelation suggests the future potential of the Union human order to be almost infinite, its 
present is always very thin. The incremental, partial, ad hoc process of disclosure generates a 
normative patchiness, incoherence, and lack of texture. If one looks at its civilizing mission, the 
most basic of civilizational tools, fundamental rights, is not fully available to EU law. It can only 
assess national action against these tools and rights insofar as this action falls within the scope of 
                                                     
25
 In Babylonian theology, the point of exaltation of a planet was taken to be an expression of divine satisfaction. The 
Exaltation of Jesus was, of course, God placing him at his right side in heaven. 
26
 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 
E.C.R. 1125, ¶ 4; Case 294/83, Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, ¶ 23. 
27
 European Union Charter Fundamental Rights, arts. 52(3) and 53, Official Journal 2007, C 303/1 
28
 Case C-236/09, Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats v. Council, 2011 E.C.R. I-773. 
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EU law, and even this is uncertain.
29
 That most unsettling of all fields of national activity, national 
security, is screened off, at least partially, from EU’s mission here.30 Finally, EU law does almost 
nothing to protect the economically marginalized and dispossessed. Its idea of community can be 
similarly critiqued. There is no provision for full political membership, and little on the quality of 
engagement or attachment within these communities necessary for belonging.
31
 The terms of 
community are also criticized as too individualistic,
32
 unduly sustaining market relations above 
other forms of social relation,
33
 and grounding entitlement from the community excessively over 
responsibility towards the community. However, it is in the field of individual subjectivity that EU 
law’s vision is the weakest. As individual subjectivity is not something that is readily inculcated by 
law, there is a void in EU law, as it offers little in terms of how EU citizens are to relate to this new 
environment.
34
  
<p1>Equally troubling is the envious relationship exaltation enjoys with acclaim. Exaltation 
is, of course only a pale substitute for acclaim. The yearning for loud acclaim is thus strong within 
the Union’s DNA, as is most saliently shown in the subjection of the Constitutional Treaty to 
multiple referenda across Europe and in the habitual referenda that are held in all accession states.
35
 
There is also a tension between exaltation and acclaim that is manifested in EU law as the tension 
between constitutionalism and democracy.
36
 EU constitutionalism requires that, at moments of 
conflict, democracy gives way to law. The reason therefore, irrespective of the merits of the 
conflict, that primacy must be granted to EU law over other law is that its “unity and effectiveness” 
must be protected.
 37
 This is not an argument one would hear about a constitution within a domestic 
                                                     
29
 Case C-617/10, Fransson, Judgment of Feb. 26, 2013. This has been contested in Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) 
[Federal Constitutional Court] Counterterrorism Database, 1 BvR 1215/07, Judgment of Apr. 24, 2013, ¶ 91 (Ger.). 
30
 See Maastricht Treaty Establishing the European Union art. 4(2), 1992 O.J. (C191) 1; 31 I.L.M. 253 [hereinafter 
TEU]. On the constraining of due process rights here, see Case C-300/11, Z.Z. v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Judgment of June 4, 2013; Joined Cases C-584, 593, and 595/10P, Commission v. Kadi, Judgment of July 
18, 2013. 
31
 On how this might happen, see Michael Saward, Enacting Citizenship and Democracy in Europe, in ENACTING 
EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP 220  (Engin F. Isin & Michael Saward eds., 2013). 
32
 Agustín José Menéndez, European Citizenship after Martínez Sala and Baumbast: Has European Law Become More 
Human but Less Social?, in THE PAST AND FUTURE OF EU LAW THE CLASSICS OF EU LAW REVISITED ON THE 50TH 
ANNIVERSARY OF THE ROME TREATY 363 (Miguel Poiares Maduro & Loïc Azoulai eds., 2010). 
33
 ALEXANDER SOMEK, ENGINEERING EQUALITY: AN ESSAY ON EUROPEAN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 21–53 (2011).  
34
 Alexander Somek, On Cosmopolitan Self-Determination, 1 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 405 (2012). 
35
 LUUK VAN MIDDELAAR, THE PASSAGE TO EUROPE: HOW A CONTINENT BECAME A UNION ch. 9 (2013).  
36
 Neil Walker, Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy: An Iterative Relationship, 39 
RECHTSFILOSOFIE & RECHTSTHEORIE 206 (2010). 
37
 Case C-416/10, Križan v. Slovenská inšpekcia životného prostredia, Judgment of Jan. 15, 2013, ¶ 70. 
PLEASE DO NOT accept/reject CHANGES. Please leave TRACK-CHANGES feature turned on. 
9 
 
context. Regard would be had to the values and safeguards provided by a constitution. EU law is 
more cherished than any other value, not because of what it does, makes possible, or even 
symbolizes, but because of what it is: the hallmark of exaltation, in this case exaltation of law over 
democracy, national law, and any other values not present within law. This is problematic in itself 
but it also establishes the even more problematic position of the creator. The creator is the source of 
all authority to whom resort can be had, irrespective of any constitutional checks, whenever further 
authority is sought. The creator of authority in the case of EU law is national executives. National 
executives are granted an unconstrained power in their role as creators not just over EU law, but, 
through it, over everything else. They can amend its authority through treaty amendments; accord it 
symbolic authority, as occurred with the Declaration attached to the Lisbon Treaty on the primacy 
of EU law;
38
 or, now, grant authority to substitutes to displace it.
39
 
<p1>Third, the institution of authority must endow the   the  authority figure with special 
qualities which will allow it to lead subjects towards this idealized way of life. Kojève’s writings 
are particularly instructive here. He observed that there are only four ideal types in Western thought 
which set out such qualities: the father, the master-slave, the judge, and the leader.
40
 Authority 
figures are either one of these or a combination. The father figure—in which the political 
community has authority because it is imputed to give rise to its subjects so that, without it, the 
subjects are reduced to bare life belonging to nobody—could not be asserted, as the Union claims 
no such hegemony over the political life of its subjects. The Hegelian master–slave relationship, 
whereby one party has authority because it has the responsibility for the conservation of the other, 
also would not apply. The Union does not possess the material resources which are at the center of a 
master–slave relationship.  
<p1>The authority figure claimed by EU law revolves, consequently, around the other two 
images: those of the judge and of the leader.  
                                                     
38
 The Treaty of Lisbon, Declarations O.J. C 115/337, 17 Declaration concerning the primacy of EU Law.  
39
 In Pringle, groups of member states were allowed to establish a wide-ranging process, the European stability 
mechanism, in fields of EU competence, economic policy, and use EU institutions to manage it even though this 
involved very different powers from their Treaty powers. The constraints were that the field should not involve 
exclusive EU competence; the Union should not be granted a specific power in the field; EU legal norms should be 
observed; and the essential character of the Institutions not be changed. The last three constraints do not seem 
meaningful. The EU has a specific power in the field of intellectual property (art. 118 TFEU) but this type of 
mechanism has, nevertheless, been deployed there, Agreement on Unified Patent Court, 2013 O.J. C 175/1. Pringle held 
fundamental rights norms do not apply as the measures are characterized as straightforward national action rather than 
action of the EU institutions, which it would otherwise have been. The character of EU institutions was also described 
in Pringle in vague terms, that of the Commission being to promote European integration and the general interest. See 
Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Judgment of Nov. 27, 2012. 
40
 ALEXANDRE KOJÈVE, LA NOTION DE L’AUTORITÉ 66–88 (2004). 
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<p1>The judge symbolizes qualities of fairness, justice, and dispassion, and acts as a 
counterpoint to other authority figures, be they the father or the master, and can even act over them. 
EU law’s civilizing mission in VGL, which is to hold other sites of power to account, speaks to this 
image. The civilizing mission also sits well with the role granted to EU law, whereby it gives rise to 
Union authority rather than the more usual converse of a sovereign granting authority to law. 
Deployment of formal rationality—whether this be scientific, economic, or legal—marks the 
exercise of this style of authority, as it gives rise to the qualities of dispassion, objectivity, and 
justice valued in the judge. It also leads to heavy reliance on law not simply to provide the 
framework for policy and government, but to be an instrument of government. This has led to the 
thicket of legal measures associated with the Union,
41
 with legislative measures being exceeded 
several fold by the delegated and implementing laws which form a central medium of EU policy.
42
 
If the value of this style of authority is its formality and dispassion, this style is also associated with 
an inflexibility, which is manifested in the complaints of economic operators about the costs of EU 
law or in lay concerns about its narrow style of risk management.
43
 
<p1>The leader, by contrast, has more wide-ranging and insightful vision than her 
followers, and accordingly greater ambition. This gets others to act on the basis of her promises as 
being more plausible than others. Joseph Weiler has thus noted the “political messianism” of the 
Union whereby the latter seeks legitimacy from the destiny it promises to achieve.
44
 This vision is 
present in VGL which defines the Union’s postnational community to be constituted by EU law and 
to be the “object” of EU law. EU law has a monopoly over the bringing into being of this 
community. It can only be realized through EU law. EU law also has a monopoly over its 
conception as it is only through EU law that the community can be imagined in the first place.  
<p1>The exercise of this style of authority has led, first, to the continual development of 
new projects. These projects must be more ambitious than those which could be achieved at a 
national level, as, otherwise, pace the subsidiarity principle, there would be no reason justifying 
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29th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law, COM(2012)714, 2. 
42
 For example, 1625 implementing measures were adopted in 2011, European Commission, Report on the Working of 
the Committees during 2011, COM(2012)685, 8. This compared with about 130 regulations and directives adopted as 
legislative acts. Damian Chalmers & Mariana Chaves, Union Democratic Overload and the Unloading of European 
Democracy Before and After the Crisis, in DEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN A EUROPEAN UNION UNDER STRESS forthcoming 
(Olaf Cramme & Sara Hobolt eds., 2014). 
43
 Mihalis Kritikos, Traditional risk analysis and releases of GMOs into the European Union: Space for non-scientific 
factors?’, 34 EUR. L. REV. 405 (2009). 
44
 Joseph Weiler, 60 Years since the First European Community—Reflections on Political Messianism, 22 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 303, 306 (2011). 
PLEASE DO NOT accept/reject CHANGES. Please leave TRACK-CHANGES feature turned on. 
11 
 
Union level action. As the Union has few resources of its own, one challenge is that, as a result, it 
must ask more of its subjects, for only the subjects can secure these aims. They can do so either by 
harnessing more actors together to realize the project. However, this can dilute accountability by 
virtue of a schema where everybody is responsible for everything, and thereby nobody for anything. 
Alternately, where it does not increase the number of actors, it can increase the levels of 
responsibility. Individual actors have to do more, something which leads to EU law being seen as 
overly demanding.
45
  
<p1>Second, the exercise of the EU-style authority has led to teleological reasoning. 
Teleological reasoning is a feature of leadership involving a complete and coherent vision of a 
future state. EU law provisions are interpreted in light of their perceived objective. This objective is 
not, however, the original intent of the law-makers but rather some general point in the horizon to 
which the provision is believed to be moving. The generality and indeterminacy of this objective 
allows the Court of Justice considerable room for maneuver. It sets out a particular linear narrative 
stretching from before the case in hand to the final realization of the objective, which obscures the 
tensions and contestation along this path. Balancing values or interests can be waylaid. 
Contemporary practicalities and consequences can get overlooked in pursuit of the dream set out in 
the final objective.
46
 
 
 
<H1>3. EU law and the government of EU subjects </H1> 
 
<p>VGL’s image of postnational community sets out what EU law “should be” about. This “should 
be” brings together an actual world, that of the practice of EU law, and a possible world, that of a 
postnational human order. It then seeks to bring these closer by finding elements of the latter 
through the interpretation of the former.
47
 This articulation of the possible structures certain 
dimensions of EU law in a very powerful way: its mode of reasoning, its iconography, and the 
architecture of its authority, most notably its raison d’être, its source, and its sustenance. It is silent 
on other significant dimensions of EU law. In particular, it does not go into what EU law does or 
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even, in detail, how it does it. It says nothing about EU law’s remit, content, incidence, or 
modalities.  
<p1>The relationship of VGL to this concrete world of rule is still significant. The case, 
after all, went to how the Dutch authorities were to administer their taxes. Its involvement is, 
however, of a different order. It goes to the contribution of EU law to the Union’s system of rule. 
This system of rule existed prior to VGL, most obviously by providing the law which gives rise to 
any provision which may have direct effect. In the European Union, it takes the form of a 
government order comprising both a public administration and a particular conception of legal and 
political power. The former provides the administrative and legal apparatus which establishes  when 
the Union can act (i.e. the remit of EU competencies and subsidiarity principle), and the institutions 
and instruments of rule. This apparatus grants the possibility for EU rule but cannot explain when 
and how EU law should regulate a given activity. The latter, the Union conception of legal and 
political power, therefore, sets out when the Union should rule, the limits to that rule, how the 
effectiveness of the rule is to be measured, how different rules relate to one another, and how a rule 
is to be reviewed. 
<p1>If the Union’s system of public administration is clear, EU law’s conception of legal 
and political power is possibly less well known. To understand how VGL contributes to this 
governmental order, it is necessary to say a few words about it. 
<p1>At the heart of a conception of government is a belief in the presence of spheres of 
activity external to the legal and political system.
48
 Examples include the workplace, the market 
place, nature, the school, the financial system, the economy, etc. These have their own modi 
operandi, characteristics, equilibriums, and systems of value. These external spheres of activity are 
perceived as enabling collective life. This grants them a life-enabling quality, which, in turn, means 
that they provide not just a terrain of action for government but a vocabulary of value. EU law is to 
do what it can to nurture these spheres of activities and its value lies largely in how it it manages to 
do this.  
<p1>These external spheres of activity determine, first, the incidence of EU law, since EU 
law comes into play as a response to their particular dynamics. The instrument for this is the Action 
Plan. Used prolifically since the early 1970s, the Action Plan outlines a program of measures  to 
protect or regulate  a sphere of activity. This programme  sets out problems to be addressed or 
schemas to be realized; justifies  EU legal action in addressing these problems; defines the role of 
the legislation; relates the legislation to existing EU law and action by other legal systems or other 
forms of regulation; and, finally, relates problems to  wider Union objectives.  
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<p1>Second, the norms of the external spheres of activity—be they industrial, scientific, 
commercial, professional, organizational, or financial—form much of the material content of EU 
law. These norms stabilize the spheres of activity by establishing conformities; allow the activities 
in question to be identified and valued by setting out a model of behavior for that activity; and 
enable the pursuit of these activities by providing a single template for how they are to be carried 
out. The discovery and protection of these norms is therefore the EU government’s central mission. 
This leads to a prizing of expertise as it is expert knowledge that enables these norms to be 
identified and developed.
49 
 Commitment to high regulatory protection is present in many of  Treaty 
provisions. It invariably carries with it a commitment to base this protection on state of the art 
expertise.
50
 Similarly, a failure to give proper effect to or to secure a sufficient quality of expertise 
in the decision-making process renders the EU measure unlawful.
51
 The centrality of these norms to 
EU government is also evidenced in the panoply of institutions and processes whose presence in EU 
decision-making is justified by their skill at norm identification and articulation: be it comitology, 
agencies, or standardization.
52
 It is also present in norm change being one of the centra motors for 
legal reform: be this  through formal amendment to legislation
53
 or through a continual adoption of 
implementing measures to mirror this change.
54
 
<p1>The role of the EU administration is that of a housekeeper to these spheres of 
activity.
55
 The external character of those spheres of activity implies that EU law  can regulate but 
not constitute them. It can contribute to the good functioning, protection, and harmony of these 
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spheres of activity but not establish them. This affects both the incidence and the modes of the EU 
government. It is only to intervene when it can enable realization of the perceived objectives of 
these spheres of activity better than other institutional orders (subsidiarity) and only to the extent 
necessary to contribute to their good functioning (proportionality). It also leads to a concern with an 
economy of government which supplants ideological contestation as the central engine of legal 
change. The Union is to do “more with less.” Intervention is to be as unobtrusive as possible to 
secure the best results possible. Within the Union, the simplification agenda led, therefore, to the 
repeal between 2005 and 2009 of 6,500 pages of legislation with a further 729 measures 
“consolidated’ within 142 acts.56 In 2012, by contrast, 84 laws were adopted through the ordinary 
legislative procedure.
57
 
<p1>VGL grants EU law those regulatory qualities which enable it to contribute actively to 
this government order. This requires EU law have qualities which allow it to be an effective 
instrument of government whilst emphasizing those qualities which allow it to be recognized as 
law. This balancing act involves addressing three different issues: the law’s relationship to other 
systems of rule; to the machinery of government within the European Union; and, lastly, the quality 
and extent of obligation that it can extract from its subjects.  
<p1>Before any of these could be addressed, VGL had to characterize the nature of EU legal 
power. As government is based on an economy of power and the only institutional power to be 
granted is that which is necessary to secure the effects desired, VGL grants EU law only power that 
is necessary to govern. It does this by returning to a distinction between a power to reign or rule and 
a power to order, execute or govern.
58
 The former is historically possessed by only the sovereign. It 
is an absolute and transcendental power. In modernity, law has often come to replace the sovereign. 
This is most vividly expressed in the idea of the rule of law, which sees law as something which can 
extend itself to rule over anything it wishes. There is a curiosity about EU law. If the treaties claim 
that the rule of law is a value on which the Union is founded,
59
 there has never been a claim to a 
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rule of EU law over anything or anybody other than the EU Institutions.
60
 This refusal to claim a 
power to rule for EU law more generally goes back to VGL, which claims no sovereign qualities for 
EU law. Instead, it holds this power of rule as something held by the national sovereign, to which it 
stands in opposition. By contrast, the power claimed for EU law by VGL is ordered power. 
However, VGL is remarkably terse on this, merely describing EU law as a “new legal order.” The 
point is made a year later, however, in Costa, which had to address the nature of EU law’s power 
more explicitly by considering whether it took precedence over national law.
61
 The reason was, the 
Court argued, that EU law’s “executive force” should not be contingent or vary. 
<p1>EU law is, therefore, endowed with an autonomous power to order the spheres of 
activity which fall within its aegis rather than with any power to rule. It is only granted those 
attributes which enable it to have sufficient ordering force to realize its objectives. If VGL and 
Costa were cryptic about the implications., These emerged over time in the three dominant 
doctrines which go to the regulatory power of the EU legal order: its autonomy, its effectiveness, 
and the fidelity principle in article 4(3) TEU.  
<p1>The autonomy of EU law governs the relationship between EU law and international 
law.
62
 It is used to explain why, although EU law is bound by international law,
63
 international law 
is not meant to rule on the central institutional features of EU law
64
 or contradict certain norms of 
EU law,
65
 and why, in many cases, international law is only to generate limited effects within EU 
law.
66
 In all cases, granting international law greater effect would compromise the autonomy of EU 
law. This doctrine of autonomy of EU law begs many questions, however. Any constraint by 
international law will, in some sense, limit EU legal autonomy. The intermittent effects granted to 
international law suggest some subtext which must go both to EU legal identity and to why it 
should give international law effect. This cannot be that EU law is a figment of international law. 
Otherwise, full effect should be given to international law, particularly as EU law could not limit its 
effects on the same basis as nation states, since the EU does not enjoy sovereignty. If EU law is not 
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such a product, this begs why it is bound by international law at all. International comity, pacta sunt 
servanda, or commitment to observance of certain values might generate certain reasons, but their 
status would be second order ones  within such a settlement, and could not explain the autonomy of 
EU law as they all cut across it. 
<p1>If the commitment to international law is seen as part of a commitment to govern 
valued spheres of activity, then the relationship becomes easier to explain. International law is 
valuable insofar as it enables an orderly management of the external spheres of activity which 
extend beyond the EU’s territorial borders. The orderly management of these activities requires that 
the EU  honor its commitments. However, this duty to respect commitments recedes if it 
undermines the EU law’s capacity to secure an orderly management of activities within the Union’s 
own territories. EU law will therefore not allow international law to allow individuals to destabilize 
its government,
67
 rob it of institutional capacity,
68
 or empower institutions to behave in a disorderly 
manner.
69
 The idea of government, consequently, has a jurisgenerative quality which both allows 
the EU to conclude international agreements and sets the level of power enjoyed by these 
agreements. 
<p1>For EU law to be effective, the effectiveness principle sets out the circumstances where 
EU law generates individual rights in national courts. It has, famously, been deployed to grant 
horizontal direct effect,
70
 direct effect to directives,
71
 state liability in general
72
 and, more 
specifically, state liability for judicial error,
73
 and incidental direct effect.
74
 Most of the architecture 
of individual legal rights in EU law, thus, relies on the effectiveness principle. However, as a 
transitive quality, effectiveness askswhat or whose effectiveness is being secured. It cannot be about 
securing the full realization and protection of the individual rights in question. If that were so, EU 
law would have to develop its own system, inter alia, of remedies, legal aid, rights of appeal, 
procedural rules. It does none of these things. The reasoning makes more sense, however, if the 
effectiveness principle  is seen as only about securing the effective operation of the spheres of 
activity which constitute the object of concern of EU government. In some instances, this reasoning 
is very explicit. The Court stated, in its founding judgments onhorizontal direct effect and incidental 
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direct effect that these doctrines were established to secure the better operation of gender equality in 
the workplace
75
 and the single market
76
 respectively. In other instances, individual rights are used as 
tools to police states into ensuring that activities operate as EU law requires they should. They kick 
in, correspondingly where there has been a failure on the part of the state. With both the direct 
effect of the directives and of state liability, the presence of fault on the part of the state was thus a 
justification for the establishment of the doctrine and is a condition of its invocation by 
individuals.
77
 This policing logic also explains EU law’s approach with regard to remedies and 
processes. If the state has a half way satisfactory framework in place,
78
 EU law will not intervene 
further as it does not wish to police too intensively.  
<p1>The governmental logic is to blame for many of the unsatisfactory qualities of EU law 
when viewed through the prism of upholding individual rights. There is the sectoral variation and 
uncertainty of application of certain doctrines, notably incidental direct effect. Other doctrines, 
notably the direct effect of the directives, are cast in terms of the institutional responsibilities of the 
state rather than in terms of the individual holding something which can be asserted against the 
world. Most devastatingly, of course, because of its weak status on remedies, EU law does not 
require that the right be fully protected or fully compensated. It requires merely that the holder of 
the right be able to exercise it in some form. 
 <p1>The fidelity principle requires all national institutions to contribute to the realization of 
EU objectives in a number of ways.
79
 It is, thus, about making national institutions an operating part 
of the machinery of EU government. If EU law were not governmental in nature, the separation of 
powers would require that courts not be seen as part of this machinery as they are required to check 
it. However, in EU law, national courts are under analogous duties to any other governmental 
institution of government. The fidelity principle, thus, requires them to do tasks which do not sit 
easily with the judicial function. Most notably, the fidelity principle introduced the doctrine of 
indirect effect which requires courts to interpret all national law in the light of all EU law. It is not 
simply that this can lead to counterintuitive interpretations of national law. Furthermore, the duty of 
interpretation is a systemic one. It applies to advancing the collective objectives of EU law even 
where there is no evidence that EU law is intended to generate individual rights with the 
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consequence that individual rights and duties in national law are determined by a provision not 
intended to mediate them directly.
80
 This can be justified if the role of the judge is simply to realize 
governmental objectives of EU law but fits less comfortably with the role of the judge as guardian 
of individual rights. 
 
 
<H1>4. Membership rights within communities of purpose dedicated to reformation of the 
state</H1> 
 
<p>The final form of claim made by VGL goes to its recognition of those interests and actors who 
can now assert EU law rights before national courts. To be sure, this grant of rights redistributes 
power as it empowers right holders at the expense of those against whom the rights are asserted. 
However, these rights also bestow a broader form of recognition by institutionalizing a public 
respect and appreciation for who the right-holders are and what they are about. In the direct 
establishment of obligations and rights, VGL also asserts a vision of community. This vision sets 
out not merely formal legal ties between individuals. The esteem demanded of others by the rights 
puts in play trajectories of mutual recognition and mutual respect between the parties which provide 
the basis for broader associative ties and collective identities. 
<p1>However, what kind of recognition is being bestowed and what kind of communities 
are being established? Both the other forms of claim made by VGL –that of setting out the 
imaginary for a posnational community and that of setting out EU law’s contribution to EU 
government- leave a trace here. 
<p1>These rights and relations contribute to an image of the Union as a postnational 
democratic community. In this community, EU citizens exercise public autonomy through 
participating as free and equal in EU law-making. VGL, thus, explicitly mentions that a special 
quality of EU law is that it brings national of the member states together within the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee with the Parliament  perhaps symbolizing a 
pan Union representative democracy and the Economic and Social Committee  a pan Union civil 
society and public sphere. Law secures citizens’ private autonomy through the grant of rights and 
the imposition of settled obligations. The reference to the peoples of Europe in the Preamble sets 
these peoples as a constituent power for this democracy on whose behalf its institutions must act. 
<p1>This image is a weak one in the judgment, however. The democratic references are not 
sustained. A much stronger logic in VGL is the governmental one in which legal communities exist 
to sustain and realize the objectives of the EU governmental order. To understand the quality of 
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governmental communities, it is necessary to refer back to the famous distinction drawn by 
Oakeshott between universitas, a community in which individuals come together promote a 
substantive purpose or perform a shared task, and, societas, a community in which individuals come 
together under common rules simple to be without the need for any further common purpose.
81
 As 
government is concerned with realizing shared objectives, its communities are of the first kind. 
They exist in relation to some shared purpose or tasks, and subjects are only recognized and granted 
membership rights insofar as they contribute to those purposes or tasks. 
<p1>The logic in VGL setting this out is an elaborate, three-tiered one. VGL, first, states that 
the Treaty has established a purpose-based association. The Treaty has a single object, namely “to 
establish a Common Market, the functioning of which is of direct concern to interested parties in 
the Community.” This objective shapes the legal quality of the Treaty. It results, according to the 
Court, in the Treaty being more than an agreement setting mutual obligations between states, but 
rather a legal order which puts in place wider associative ties. The direct concern of this shared 
purpose to individuals marks it, moreover, as the basis for these ties, giving rise to them and 
conditioning them.  
<p1>Second, VGL it ties the realization of this objective to the establishment of an 
institutional apparatus, the EU Institutions, which are to administer it. The judgment states these are 
established with “sovereign rights” for this purpose. “Sovereign rights” do not mean sovereignty 
here, as, otherwise, EU institutions would be above even EU law. Rather, the term refers to 
government powers and harks back to a seventeenth-century distinction in which the sovereign was 
allowed to grant administrative institutions sovereign rights to govern without losing her 
sovereignty.
82
 This distinction was present in the thinking of the time. Ophuls, the German delegate 
to the ECSC, for example, talked of the pooling of sovereign rights amongst the ECSC Institutions, 
by which he meant that the presence of a more powerful administrative apparatus than was allowed 
for by traditional treaties.
83
  
<p1>Third, VGL sets out the treaties as protecting external spheres of activity, which are 
now to be governed through legal rights and responsibilities. This last point is tacitly present in the 
statements in VGL in the extract quoted earlier that individuals are subjects of EU law in the same 
way as states, and that EU law, consequently, directly provides them with both rights and 
obligations. This  legal status as subjects recognizes individuals  as having an active presence 
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independent of EU law. They are granted rights by EU law but they are not constituted by it. Their 
agency is only protected by EU law in the context of relations where EU law imposes duties on 
others to recognize certain elements of it: in VGL, the right to import goods free of customs duty. It 
is the relationship which EU law is committed to uphold, recognize, and protect, as it is a 
relationship which forms part of the external sphere of activity which constitutes the focus of EU 
government. It is now also seen as a relationship of legal commitments, rights, and responsibilities. 
<p1>VGL sets up the European Union, therefore, as a universitas in which subjects come 
together to realize and contribute to common purposes tied to the legal and administrative order of 
the Union. This idea of community shapes how subjects engage with each other and EU law. It is a 
profoundly disquieting one. Parties are only recognized for what they do that is seen as of value 
rather than for other elements of their identity. It can, thus, happen that some parties who do nothing 
of value at all are not recognized at all. In addition, actors’ relative capacities become central to 
whether they are accorded rights with rights likely to be granted to those who “can” rather than to 
those who “cannot.”  
<p1>VGL only provided a template for action, however. The extent of take-up depended 
upon subsequent institutional practice, in particular the allocation of rights. If the governmental 
logic was followed, one would expect relatively few justiciable entitlements to be granted. Such 
entitlements will only be granted if they contribute to shared purpose valued by the Union. From the 
point of the policy-maker, this will rarely be the case as the unpredictability of litigants and courts 
make such rights an unreliable policy tool. Litigants might use these entitlements for purposes other 
than those anticipated; or, through an unexpected judgment, rights might be granted to unwanted 
beneficiaries. Judgments are difficult to correct and suffer from the policy question being seen 
through the prism of the dispute. Litigation is time-consuming and uncertain leading to generalized 
instability during this period. By contrast, if the logic of democratic community was embraced, one 
would see a much wider distribution of rights with these seen as empowering tools which all 
citizens should hold in relation to important parts of their economic, social and cultural lives.  
<p1>This study, therefore, looked at the litigation which gave rise to all preliminary rulings 
between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2011. For each judgment, we looked at the field of EU 
law litigated; the instrument deployed; and the nationality of the litigants and their socio-economic 
background. In total, there were 1,025 judgments generating over 13,000 observations. Finally, the 
salience of the judgment, at least in the eyes of the CJEU, was assessed by looking at whether the 
CJEU thought a judgment sufficiently important to be mentioned in its Annual Report. This was a 
relatively low threshold as 285 of 1025 judgments, i.e. over a quarter, were mentioned in these 
Reports. To be sure, the preliminary reference procedure is only a rough proxy for which provisions 
are invoked before national courts. The time and cost of the procedure, in particular, might lead to a 
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significant difference in the two. However, it is the only pan-Union indicator, and none of the other 
studies have found a material difference between the provisions invoked in national courts and thus 
referred to the Court of Justice.
84
 
<p1>Table 1 sets out those fields of EU litigation which averaged three or more judgments 
per year during the period: a very low threshold as this equates to one reference per member state 
every nine years. At the time, the Court set out on its web site fifty-six fields of EU law. Eighteen 
fields met this threshold of three or more judgments. This included many significant policy fields 
(single market (approximation of laws), external relations, social policy, environmental and 
consumers, taxation and the area of freedom, security and justice, and the central iconic fields of 
EU law (the economic freedoms and competition). However, if one delves deeper, a different 
picture emerges.  
<p1>At the end of 2011, in addition to the Treaties, there were 8,862 regulations and 1,885 
directives in force.
85
 Very little of this has been litigated. Instead, the litigation divides into three 
clusters: 
<NL>  
(i) In eleven fields, litigation is concentrated on a narrow range of instruments. Six fields 
center on particular Treaty provisions (the economic freedoms and competition). Other 
sectors are dominated by litigation of one of two instruments (taxation, social security 
for migrant workers, customs union, and common customs tariff, police, and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters).
86
 
(ii) There are four fields whose legislative output is immense (single market, environment, 
external relations and agriculture). The proportion of instruments litigated is a tiny 
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proportion of those adopted in these fields. To give but one example, the single market 
comprised 1,388 directives and 1,439 regulations in October 2011.
87
 It thus gave rise to 
about one judgment during the period for every twenty five pieces of legislation.  
(iii)There are three fields which involve a significant range of legislation of which a diverse 
proportion is litigated (social policy, intellectual, and industrial policy, area of freedom, 
security, and justice). </NL> 
<COM: insert Table 1 around here> 
<p1>Litigation thus centers on Treaty provisions, isolated pieces of legislation, and those 
last three fields of EU law. It is a narrow proportion of EU legislation which is litigated with all the 
corollary implications for the democratic qualities of the Union. There rests the issue, however, of 
why these sectors or instruments are litigated, and, if this litigation goes to certain communities of 
purpose, the nature of the communities which gives rise to individual rights. 
<p1>Chalmers and Chaves have suggested a political economy to this.
88
 The dominant 
interests involved in EU law-making have little interest in creating entitlements to be invoked by 
other actors in arenas, such as courts, whose decision-making is often unpredictable. This aversion 
would only be dispelled where there was some clear alternate advantage to this. This would most 
obviously be the case, they argued, with “patrol norms.” When a market in a service or good was 
established, EU law also prescribes the fiscal, penal, and regulatory duties enjoyed by states in 
relation to that market. Actors involved in establishing this market would have an interest in 
ensuring that the agreed level of regulation, taxation, etc. was patrolled to ensure that states did not 
resettle the terms of the pact. Such norms, patrol norms, would include market access provisions, 
requirements of equal treatment or due process provisions. A feature of patrol norms is that the state 
will always be a party to the litigation as it is being patrolled. Other litigants will vary according to 
the political economy of the sector. In Table 2, we see the dominant litigant to be the state, which 
accounts for 38 percent of the litigants, a very high proportion.
89
 There is high state involvement not 
just in fields where one would expect to see it, such as migration, criminal justice, and tax, but in 
nearly all sectors. It is only low in one field of litigation, intellectual and industrial property, and 
below 30 percent in only three other fields: (i) competition, (ii) law of undertakings (company law), 
and (iii) the area of freedom, security, and justice (due to a number of judgments on judicial 
cooperation in civil matters).  
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<COMP: Insert Table 2 around here> 
<p1>To see whether these patterns of litigants were strongly informed by features of the 
preliminary reference procedure and not present in more general litigation before domestic courts, 
we looked at the range of commercial litigants using the preliminary reference and the commercial 
sectors litigated. If the cost of the procedure was inhibiting certain actors from using it, one would 
expect large commercial actors to be more strongly represented. If the politics of the procedure was 
driving it, namely it was being persistently used to secure legislative change rather than for any 
other reason, one would expect sectoral variation. Commercial sectors in which form of politics was 
more strongly present would be more represented than other sectors. A breakdown of commercial 
litigations in Table 3 reveals the presence of litigation in all sectors and a relatively even 
distribution between commercial actors of sizes, with it fair to presume that a large proportion of 
the 44 percent of commercial actors whose workforce size could not be identified are small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Table 2 indicates, furthermore, an even spread between 
domestic commercial actors and multinational actors, with 23 percent of all litigation, 63.89 percent 
of all commercial litigation, involving domestic firms and the remainder, multinational actors. 
<COMP: insert Table 3 around here> 
The focus of litigation is, in the bulk of cases, thus the reformation of the state. Litigation 
against the state goes to how the administration punishes, taxes, regulates, distributes (in a narrow 
range of cases), or polices its territory and borders. These are above all organizations that are 
engaged in this reformation. Forty-three percent of litigants, over two-thirds of non-state litigants, 
are organizations.
91
 The organizations are, moreover, overwhelming commercial ones, with over 
five times as many of these present as non-commercial actors. This reformation of the states tells us 
also something about the nature of the community established in the wake of VGL. Insofar as they 
involve the grant of legal rights, they do so to realize the collective purposes set out for the state by 
EU law, be these regulatory, fiscal, or penal. The central rights granted, therefore, on the one hand, 
those designed to realize that the state extract no more from citizens than that necessary to realize 
those objective set by EU law and, on the other, to police the thresholds required for it by EU law. 
An example of the former is the EU Valued Added Tax System. The central individual rights go to 
limiting the goal of securing revenue on all commercial transactions by allowing individuals to 
claim that they are not taxable, the activities are not taxable or the tax is deductible.
92
 An example 
of the latter involves the panoply of environmental legislation concerning land use whereby actors 
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affected by a development have both rights of notice and comment before the authorities making a 
decision on whether to authorize it and rights to ensure that a proper assessment is carried out.
93
 
<p1>Reformation of the state may be the dominant narrative of the legal communities 
enabled by VGL. It is not the only narrative, and indeed is not the central one told by the European 
Court of Justice. Table 1 shows the fields of EU law most frequently cited in the latter’s Annual 
Reports fall into two categories (see the “salience” categories). The first are those fields with high 
numbers of non-commercial private actors. All fields, with the exception of two weakly litigated 
fields, external relations and social security for migrants, where actors comprise 40 percent or more 
of litigants are accorded a strong salience by the Court.
94
 The second are those fields of law based 
on Treaty provisions with well-established lines of case law. All the economic freedoms (with the 
exception of free movement of capital) and competition are cited heavily in the Annual Reports. 
Combining these categories allows the CJEU to establish a progression between the heritage of the 
early case law of the Court on the Treaty and the protection of individual rights of non-commercial 
actors. This lineage allows a story to be told where the Court starts with the establishment of a 
constitutional system (so the economic freedoms and VGL) which then unfolds into a more 
generalized constitutional protection of individual rights, notwithstanding that the cases in question 
are about very different things. This narrative does not represent the more general picture. Nor does 
it work as a description of the most important judgments. Politically divisive fields with wider 
distributive consequences such as taxation, the environment, and consumers, and approximation of 
laws are not presented as significant. Equally, some fields, such as freedom of establishment and 
free movement of persons, are presented as significant when fields with analogous fact situations, 
such as free movement of capital and social security for EU migrants, are not.  
<p1>This narrative can only be explained by a difference in the quality of the litigation 
which allows the Court to mark it out. Chalmers and Chaves identified it with an alternative 
narrative, the presence of “thickly evaluative” norms in EU law.95 These set out general values to be 
realized through the grant of entitlements. Examples include the economic freedoms, non-
discrimination, and free competition.
96
 The central thrust of the entitlement is realization of the 
value to which it is giving effect. It is difficult to talk of individuals of coming together for some 
shared purpose in the same concrete way as with other fields of EU law. This is reflected by the 
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political economy behind the establishment of such norms. If there is a shared commitment to these 
values, there is deep disagreement about what these values entail and what they mean in precise 
contexts. Courts are, thus, entrusted with the elaboration of these norms both because they are 
perceived as having a specialized form of moral expertise and because they are skilled in applying 
norms to complex factual situations, and are simultaneously held in check by their judgments being 
confined to these situations.  
<p1>It is, however, a limited narrative. The circumstances in which norms come into being 
tend, however, only to be Treaty negotiations: moments when the general values of the Union are 
reflected upon and there is not the possibility for legislation to be influenced by a sectorally narrow 
range of interests. Most thickly evaluative norms date back to the Treaty (i.e. economic freedoms, 
competition). The only significant exception is Social Policy. However, even here, a strong 
proportion of the litigation and legislation extrapolates the equal opportunities principle set out in 
the Treaty requirement, article 157 TFEU, that men and women receive equal pay for work of equal 
value. Beyond this, there is no sense of a sustained engagement to develop these types of norm. 
Even in a field such as the area of freedom, security, and justice, which might lend itself to this, 
insofar as it frequently involves giving effect to values of humanitarian protection, there is 
remarkably little litigation of such norms. It is also increasingly institutionally confined. The EU 
legislature seeks to interpret these norms like all other provisions, so often locates them against 
some wider collective shared purpose. Action plans have, thus been, set visioning both the rights set 
out in economic freedoms and EU antidiscrimination law as forming part a wider agenda advancing 
of some wider collective good.
97
 There has also been strong domestic resistance. A considerable 
part of the defiance by senior national courts to EU law has focused, therefore, on perceived over-
extension of these thick evaluative norms, most notably on non-discrimination,
98
 citizenship,
99
 and 
fundamental rights.
100
 A similar picture emerges with national legislatures in the fields of 
fundamental rights
101
 and citizenship.
102
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<H1>5. The creation of meaning in EU law</H1> 
<p>These communities of purpose inform the meaning of EU law, first, by providing the setting for 
its interpretation. This will shape the questions asked of particular provisions and the consequences 
attached to their interpretation. For example, the issues which arise in relation to human dignity 
with regard to the patenting of stem cells are very different from those which arise with regard to 
possible overzealous questioning by border guards.
103
 In addition, they set out the central semantic 
structures guiding interpretation of individual EU provisions. Interpretation of a legal provision 
relies, generally, on some idea of the form of association which both gives rise to the activity being 
regulated and is the medium through which legal intervention takes place.
104
 The central method of 
EU legal interpretation explicitly ties these relations to this idea of communities of purpose. The 
Court has, thus, repeatedly stated that legal interpretation must have regard not only to the wording 
of a provision, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of 
which it is part.
105
 These objectives and contexts are not abstract ideals, but combine to set out a 
vision of a way of life with its own social relations, geared to securing a collective goal. 
<p1>This vision of community is very different from that typical of modern liberal political 
and legal systems. These build their notions of community around a tension and interplay between 
two forms of association. The one is based around ties existing by virtue of acknowledgement or 
communication of co-presence, and the other around individuals coming together to realize shared 
purposes. The societas and universitas distinction has already been mentioned,
106
 but this interplay 
is pervasive across twentieth century political theory, social theory, or philosophy and is deployed 
by writers from across the political spectrum. A variety of terms are deployed:
 
life, world, and 
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system;
107
 purposeful living and external rationality;
108
 or singularity and transcendence.
109
 This 
interplay stops the dangers of abstraction and over-reification posed by a community of co-
presence, and the dangers of functionalism and instrumentality posed by a community of shared 
purposes, whereby the value of every act and person is seen exclusively in terms of their 
contribution to the shared purpose. The recognition by EU law of only one form of association, 
association by dint of shared purposes, disrupts and distorts this vocabulary of value. It is worth 
pausing to reflect, for example, what place exists for values such as individual autonomy; kinship 
and tradition in a community of shared purpose, as none of these go to realization of a task, but to 
co-presence and a shared imagination and commitment to one another.  
<p1>Less speculatively, it is reflected in the incidence and meaning of EU law. The best 
illustration of this is that most evocative norm in EU law, freedom of expression. Set out in article 
11 European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, it offers the promise of EU law setting out 
markets place for ideas and providing arenas for individual self-realization through expression of 
one’s own identity.  
<p1>If one turns, first, to how the incidence of freedom of expression in EU law, in the five-
year period up until the end of 2011, the CJEU gave thirteen judgments involving meaningful 
questions of freedom of expression. This is a significant number. The field is, however, a confined 
one. The judgment concerned the immunities of Members of the European Parliament;
110
 state 
liability for statements of public officials;
111
 the limits of intellectual property rights;
112
 duties on 
broadcasters to show certain programs in the general interest;
113
 restrictions on advertising of 
medicinal products;
114
 data protection;
115
 and public interest restrictions on broadcasting.
116
 The 
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center of gravity of the field is, thus, freedom of commercial expression with the two most litigated 
issues being competitors deploying it to whittle down the protection of intellectual property right 
holders and broadcasters invoking it to limit the programs they are required to broadcast in the 
public interest. There is, of course, a betrayal of promise in this. The rich potential of the term gives 
rise to an underwhelming reality. It might be argued that this deployment of freedom of expression 
still generates a sensibility which would otherwise be absent. National restrictions on broadcasters’ 
duties are consequently required to be stable and transparent.
117
 However, understandings of 
freedom of expression are shaped by the nature of the activity regulated. For this will provide the 
language through which questions about the appropriateness of any curbs and the value of the 
expression are assessed. 
<p1>A good example is L’Oreal v. eBay.118 In an action by the perfume and cosmetics 
company to stop the online market place being used for sale of its products which infringed its 
trademarks, one of the issues at stake concerned the duties to be imposed on online market places 
by virtue of Directive 2004/48, which requires both effective, dissuasive measures to be put in place 
to secure the enforcement of intellectual property rights and the principle of freedom of expression 
to be observed. The Court held that these service providers were required not merely to prevent 
existing violations of intellectual property rights, but also take measures to stop future violations. 
However, what did this mean and what happened if they failed in this duty? This issue was 
approached through the prisms of the demands of this particular market. The Court noted, with 
regard to the first question, that online marketplaces were not required actively to monitor 
transactions taking place. They could be required only to ask for the identity of sellers and buyers to 
be verified. The issue was, thus, addressed as one of practical regulatory burden in light of the scale 
of market demands: that it might generate privacy concerns or, from the viewpoint of the right 
holder, lead to sporadic policing was not the point. Similarly, the penalties to be issued against 
online market places which failed to do this were couched purely in terms of their right to trade. 
There was to be no permanent ban from the internet. Other restrictions or penalties (i.e. fans, 
temporary bans) might be possible. 
<p1>The graver threat is the semantic question. If the meaning of EU legal norms is to be 
interpreted in the light of the shared purposes to which EU law gives effect, these quickly cease to 
be an independent parameter against which to review EU government but instead become 
interpreted as to how they can best serve EU government. Freedom of expression, for example, is 
thus seen as an outcome of EU government whose meaning is realized through EU legislative 
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activities. These, thus come to define it. This not only sanctifies the EU’s work and shields it from 
more probing scrutiny, but it also leads to highly unusual interpretations.  
<p1>The most salient judgment of recent times on freedom of expression was Mesopotamia, 
which went to the limits in EU law on political speech.
119
 Two Danish companies broadcast 
television programs throughout Europe supportive of the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party), a group 
classified as a terrorist organization by the European Union. Following a complaint from the 
Turkish Government, the German government sought to stop broadcasts into Germany on the 
grounds that they violated principles of international understanding, albeit that the programs could 
still be rebroadcast from Germany to other states, and the Danish authorities had found that there 
was no incitement to racial hatred and the broadcasts were largely facts and opinion. The question 
was referred to the CJEU whether Germany could invoke the exception in the Broadcasting 
Directive to restrict the broadcasts on the grounds that they incited racial hatred.   
<p1>The Court did not review the Broadcasting Directive against an autonomous parameter 
of freedom of expression. Instead, it stated that the directive was a “manifestation” of the more 
general principle of freedom of expression. Freedom of expression in EU law could, thus, only be 
understood through the prism of the text of the directive, which set it out as a detailed legal reality. 
In this instance, the issue in hand, namely the extent to which political expression may advocate 
political violence, was to be determined by the relevant provision of the directive, which required 
member states to ensure that broadcasts did “not contain any incitement to hatred on grounds of 
race, sex, religion, or nationality.” The Court ruled that the provision should be given an everyday 
meaning taking into account the surrounding legal context of the directive. Such a meaning would 
lead incitement to hated could cover “any action intended to direct specific behaviour and to 
generate a feeling of animosity or rejection towards a group of persons.” Initiatives attempting to 
justify violence by terrorist acts against a particular group of persons fell within such a definition, 
and the Court, thus, found that the broadcasts could be banned from transmission within Germany. 
<p1>This interpretation makes sense within a worldview whose central focus is to secure a 
market in transnational broadcasts which do not incite racial hatred. For such a market, the 
prohibition on incitement to racial hatred must be cast in terms which are sufficiently stable and 
clear for regulators to develop explanatory guidelines and for broadcasters to plan their international 
operations. It must be cast in generalizable terms so that incitement to racial hatred is likely to be 
understood in similar ways in different states. Otherwise, transnational broadcasts will not be 
possible. Finally, the term must follow the position of the most protective state if there is not to be 
the accusation that the Union is allowing racism to be propagated in ways that would not have been 
possible previously. Mesopotamia does all this. It deploys general terms which are not explicitly 
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dependent for their meaning on local contexts or traditions. Its definition is so embracing that it 
would allow broadcasts to be restricted if these were supportive of the ANC during the apartheid 
period, the Free Syrian Army, regional boycotts of services or goods, and, arguably, Occupy Wall 
Street protests targeted at bankers.  
<p1>This contrasts with traditional debates on when expression elides into hate speech. In 
some jurisdictions, autonomy is highly valued, so expression is only illegal where it incites 
violence. Others concern themselves far more with the dignity or honor of others. A third position 
sees the matter in more situated terms, and looks at whether the expression is understood by the 
target group as denigrating it and by other groups as desensitizing them to abuse of that group.
 120
 
Finally, there are jurisdictions whose laws contain a mixture of these elements.
121 
The definition in 
Mesopotamia has no clear reference to any of these issues of autonomy, dignity or context. This 
accounts for its breadth and its generality. However, more disturbingly, it also accounts for its lack 
of ethical compass. There is an absence of any sense of understanding of either the normative 
demands of individuality or community against which such speech can be located.
122
 Such concepts 
are simply not present. As a consequence, freedom of expression becomes whatever EU 
government—in this instance, through the EU directive—wants it to be.  
 
<H1>6. Conclusion </H1> 
<p>VGL, finally, stands for poignancy. The fecund, rich vision of postnational community has left a 
legacy of weakly constrained government, thinly distributed rights and a legal vocabulary of stunted 
meanings. It was clearly not anticipated to be so. And, in one sense, it does not remain so. The 
seductive promise of VGL, and its continual revelation of what the Union could be, still remains. 
The reason for this promise not being realized is both trite and profound. The reason is that the 
imagery and ideals of the postnational community set out in VGL have insufficient resonance and 
force within EU law. The more profound answer is that EU law does not have a clear enough idea 
of societas, community as co-presence. The lack of interplay between this idea of community and 
that of universitas, community as shared purpose, leads to all the problems set out in this essay. EU 
law instruments are conceived in terms of their regulatory qualities, and thus do not generate the 
rights that they should. Substantive entitlements are largely granted only to those who will serve EU 
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government objectives, resulting, in many areas of EU law, in granting entitlement to the powerful 
rather than the marginalized. Finally, laws are not granted a meaning sufficiently autonomous from 
the goals pursued by EU government. They become a cover for government and a justification for it 
rather than something which acts as a counterpoint to it. If VGL is not to be condemned to just being 
a promise of hope, the challenge for the heirs to its better tradition is to find those legal structures 
which anchor this richer notion of community as interplay between shared purpose and co-presence 
within EU law.  
 
